Home / The model / The capabilities / authenticate-as.credential.signing
authenticate-as.credential.signing
Sign commits with the key it holds. Its effect is no: cannot be undone.
What this id is made of
This is not a string. It is authenticate-as.credential.tenant, three nodes joined by three edges, and each of them has an address, a page and a JSON file. Follow any of them and you get the query for that word rather than a definition of it.
| Node | Edge | Reads as |
|---|---|---|
authenticate-as | has_verb | this capability has the verb authenticate-as |
credential | acts_on | this capability acts on credential |
tenant | reaches | this capability reaches tenant |
code | in_family | this capability is in the code family |
no | has_undo_class | this capability has the undo class no |
The gloss above is a convenience, not the definition. A node carries no inherent meaning: what
authenticate-as.credential.signing is emerges from the edges traceable from it. The strongest case is tenant, where the deployment shapes that use it do not agree about what it means, and the page keeps the disagreement rather than averaging it.In 3 of 17 published shapes
| Deployment shape | Barrier there | Known by | Whose material | Note | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ● | Claude Code on the web (a remote session container) | none (not a control) | observed | not stated | commits are signed with the session's own key, registered as an agent identity in this site's registry (sha256-f9facb4c94da6c19) - not with yours |
| ● | Claude Code (the CLI, on your own machine) | none (not a control) | documented | not stated | if commit signing is configured for the account, the agent signs as you |
| ● | Claude Code (the CLI, on your own machine) | none (not a control) | documented | not stated | if commit signing is configured for the account, the agent signs as you |
| Barrier | What stands in the way | Is it a control | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ● | none | nothing in the way | no |
| ◉ | expectation | a rule in prose, enforced by nobody | no |
| ◐ | setting | a switch the agent's own account can flip | no |
| ○ | boundary | enforced above the grant, out of the agent's reach | yes |
What the starting mandates say about it
| The mandate says | Which mandates |
|---|---|
| authorised | none |
| refused | A coding assistant on my machine, A coding assistant in a container on the web |
| unstated | The desktop app, with local tools switched on, Chat, with connectors switched on, Chat in the browser, nothing connected, A CI job on a hosted runner, A browser extension I installed, A scheduled job under a service account, A reader on my mailbox, Find things in the inbox, draft replies, never send, A reader on my drive, Search our tenant, read-only, Find and read my files, An assistant over my Workspace, reading, A sandbox: build and run one AI-agent workflow, What the agent inferred it was authorised to do, from one session |
Unstated is not authorised. A mandate that never mentioned a capability did not authorise it, and the delta on every example page counts it as excess and says which kind it was.
What would move it to the fourth barrier
| What | What it costs | The barrier afterwards |
|---|---|---|
| a signing key of the agent's own, so its commits are signed as it and not as you (the registry's identity records exist for this) | an hour, and a second key to manage | boundary |
This is a published reduction, not a recommendation. Whether it is worth doing depends on the assets and the consequences, which are not in this document and are not this site's to guess. Since v0.4.3 it is also a node,
setting/authenticate-as.credential.signing, in the deployment shape universe: it narrows this capability and moves it to the barrier named in the third column, which is the path the prohibitions table's last column is a projection of.