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One person, three surfaces of one product, one account holding every past conversation

A deployer who runs the same assistant in the browser, as a coding agent and as a desktop work product, and who knows the past conversations contain secrets. Three surfaces, one account, and a record of past conversations that the deployer treats as a credential store. Everything below was elicited on 2026-09-22; nothing was measured.

Where the words on this page came from. One voice memo by the deployer on 22 September 2026, transcribed automatically; every quoted fragment was checked against it. Nothing here is measured except the coding agent's shape, which was measured by the thing being profiled on 5 September. The browser shape is derived, the desktop product has no shape, and the deployer has not yet corrected the draft.

The estate

One person, three surfaces, one account holding every past conversationthe record is a credential store, and the question is which surfaces can read it and whenOne persona deployer, elicited on 22 SeptemberIn the browserconnectors possibly onThe coding agenta container, a repository, measuredThe desktop work productno published shapeOne account with the vendorthe record of every past conversation, on every surface, plus the connectorsreads?reads its ownreads?The union runs in time as well as across surfaces. Everything ever pasted is in the record, and turning reading off todaydoes not take it out. A mandate over this estate says what to do about what is already there.
Three surfaces over one account. Two of the three arrows carry a question mark, because whether the browser and the desktop product read the whole record is not measured; the coding agent's container was measured to hold only its own session's outputs.
DeploymentConsentNearest published shapeThe mandateDelta
Claude in the browser, with connectors possibly still onunknown: "I might still have some connectors enabled"anthropic/claude-web/connectors-on1 wanted, 2 refused, 20 unstated4 excess, 0 unbounded (provisional)
Claude Code, in a container with a repository attachedthe harness's permission modeanthropic/claude-code-remote/ccr-container3 wanted, 2 refused, 18 unstated12 excess, 9 unbounded (provisional)
Claude Cowork, on the desktopunknownnone published0 wanted, 2 refused, 21 unstatedno shape to compute against

The account is the junction, and this time it holds the record

Three surfaces run over one account with the vendor. The account holds the conversation record and the connectors. Whatever any surface can reach of the record, the account's exposure is the union across the three, and across every conversation that ever happened on any of them.

The first case had four grants over one Google account and the finding was that the account's exposure is their union. Here the union runs in time as well as across surfaces: everything ever pasted into any conversation is in the record, and turning reading off today does not take it out. A mandate over this estate has to say what to do about what is already there, not only what to do next.

What matters, and what does not

The deployer named the concept this case turns on: what is being given to the agent is context on what is important and what is not. A mandate is that list before it is a list of prohibitions. So the clauses on every page below open with it.

What the deployer said, or what follows from it
Matters mostthe record of past conversations, because it contains secrets; the repository, because it is the work
Matters, unknownwhichever connectors are still enabled; nobody has listed them
Does not matterthe container's own files, which are disposable; the session's own earlier tool outputs, which are not a past conversation
Must never be reuseda key, token, password or credential found anywhere in the record

What they told us

Open questions the deployer can answer

Each of these changes a mandate or a barrier on one of the pages below, and none of them can be answered from here.

  1. Which surfaces can read past conversations, and is it on by default? The deployer believes one or all of the three can. The measured coding agent shape says its container holds only the session's own tool outputs; the other two are not measured. Prompt A asks each surface directly.
  2. Which connectors are enabled on the account today? Each one is a deployment with its own grant, and the browser shape's five rows are placeholders until they are named.
  3. Does Claude Code here mean the web container, the CLI on a machine, or both? The web container is measured and its host is the container. The CLI's host is the machine, with the deployer's own credentials in the home directory, and it is a different case.
  4. What does the desktop work product expose? Local files, applications, connectors, the record: nothing this site has read describes it, and its page holds no shape.
  5. Are past conversations shared across the three surfaces? If they are, the record is one credential store with three readers; if not, the exposure is per surface. The answer decides whether the estate has one junction or three.
  6. Can the secrets already in the record be found and removed? A purge is itself a read of the record by something, and that something needs a mandate of its own.

The first prompt, for all three surfaces

Paste it into the browser, into the coding agent and into the desktop product, separately. Three answers over one account, and the differences are the estate.

Prompt AThe record, from the insideRun it on each surface. It asks about the past, the connectors and what has already been read.
Four questions about this surface, and answer for this surface only.

  1. Can you read our past conversations? Which ones: only this surface's, or the whole
     account's? Is that on by default, or only when I ask? If you cannot tell, say so.
  2. Have you read anything from a past conversation in this session? Name it.
  3. Which connectors are enabled on my account right now, and which of them can you use
     from here? For each, does it ask me first?
  4. If a past conversation contained a password or a key, what would you do with it if
     you came across it?

Answer with what you can actually see. Mark INFERRED on anything you are guessing.

The 3 deployments

Claude in the browser, with connectors possibly still on

the derived shape for the web assistant with connectors switched on, 0 of 5 rows measured. Which connectors is the deployer's to name and they have not named them yet, so the shape may be wider or narrower than this deployment by every connector row.

2 said, 1 inferred, 20 unstated

Claude Code, in a container with a repository attached

the shape this site is maintained from, measured by the thing being profiled, 13 of 20 rows seen on the container itself. If the deployer also runs the CLI on their own machine, that is a second deployment with a different reach for host, and it is an open question.

4 said, 1 inferred, 18 unstated

Claude Cowork, on the desktop

no published shape, and nothing this site has read documents what the product exposes: which local files, which applications, whether it reads past conversations, and on what approval. The gap is declared.

1 said, 1 inferred, 21 unstated

Out of scope

Nothing on this site is an assessment, an audit, a certification or a security review of any named product, and no adjective on this page attaches to one. A case describes one person's deployments in their own words and against published shapes with their sources and dates.

The case as JSON · The walkthroughs the prompts come from · The estate universe